LM05b: Worker/Management Cooperation: Going Forward

Worker/Management Cooperation: Going Forward

The Electromation case crystallized the tensions embedded in the original Wagner Act. In the non-unionize workplace, management needs a way to talk to workers about issues of "mutual interest" while, at the same time, workers need a genuine, and independent, way to decide who shall represent them at any "talks" with management. The huge middle ground left in the Wagner Act, either vote to have a union or have nothing, has sprouted many proposals. I will look at proposals from three sources: legal scholars, the Dunlop Commission, and Congress (the TEAM Act). In the last section I will present my own recommendations based on these sources.

Legal Scholarship

Articles in law journals first brought my attention to the importance of the Electromation case. Martin Moe's article in the New York Law Review on the implication of Electromation, maintained that the Board missed a critical opportunity to settle this part of labor law. To Moe, the Board's conceptual splitting of issues of "quality" from "conditions of employment" misconstrues the realities of the modern workplace. "Wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and conditions of work are intimately related to productivity and efficiency and, in fact, may be crucial factors in improving productivity and efficiency."1

Moe also chastises the Board for failing to find a representational requirement in interpreting Section 2(5). By only looking at Cabot Carbon, the Board lost a chance to view the role of employees in a bilateral management-worker committee in a larger context. From this line of argument Moe concluded:

The shortcomings of Electromation and its progeny illustrate that the NLRB must reformulate standards for Section 2(5) and 8(a)(2) which provide clear guidance for employers and employees and take into account the great differences between the company unions of the 1930s and modern modes of employee involvement. Because over eighty-seven percent of the United States' private sector workforce is not unionized, the Board's restrictive interpretation leaves the vast majority of American workers with an unsatisfactory (and unproductive) choice-representation by a traditional independent union or no collective voice in the processes and conditions of the workplace. This Note argues that the Board's outdated and inflexible statutory construction should be jettisoned in favor of an interpretation that both preserves employee autonomy and grants employers and employees the opportunity to utilize mutually beneficial ways of cooperating in the workplace.2

According to Moe, neither the circuit courts nor Congress will be the institutions to reinterpret the Wagner Act as needed for modern workplace practices. The Board ignores contrary circuit court findings because of its responsibility to uphold a uniform national labor policy; and "the chances are high that any significant legislative proposal to amend the Wagner Act will become mired in political stalemate"3-witness the fate of the TEAM Act described later in this paper.

Central to Moe's proposed reinterpretation of Section 2(5) is a requirement that the Board define representation and then follow its definition. Moe offered three criteria: (1) the degree to which alleged worker representatives were formally (e.g., by election or nomination) designated representative of other workers; (2) evidence that employees believe the employee group speaks in its behalf; and (3) the amount of evidence that the employer set up the program, with employer initiation weighing against a finding of representativeness.4

Moe's suggestion for reinterpreting Section 8(a)(2) pivots on how the employees view the situation, and that the Board needs to make a distinction between cooperation and domination. He suggests that a cooperative arrangement, with clear assurances from management to employees that they can have an independent bargaining agent of their own choosing would leave the way free for workers to accept a scheme of representation which does not involve an outside union, if it is one that they like.5

This proposal will not work for many workers since they do not trust the "clear assurances" of management.6 This proposal ignores the dominate role management attitudes play in the minds of workers. In addition, in actual practice, workers seeking a change would still face the same practical and political difficulties (including hostile management attitudes) of changing workplace governance practices they have now. By offering only management the option of establishing "cooperative arrangements" without workers being able to vote on the form of representation they prefer, Moe circles back to the very issues joined in the Electromation case which he is trying to solve.

Another legal scholar, Mark Barenberg, found a different tack for finding a way forward. Where Moe would dive into the law and remake it by reinterpretation, Barenberg rises above it, and seeks resolution to the problems of workers' voice in the nonunion workplace by creating new fora for broadening the discussion. Barenberg's solution includes three main components:

Institutional component: Regional "Centers for Advanced Workplace Participation";

Self-Governance Component: Ensuring Workers' Active Choice Among Governance Modes; and

Process Component: Formal, Nonadversarial "Conferences for Employee Choice."7

Barenberg offers a novel approach for a mechanism for weaving these components and gradually moving our workplace environment from one of low-trust to one of higher trust with increased worker choice and improved productivity: government facilitated deliberative conferences. Barenberg thinks "the legal regime should afford employees a protected forum, radically removed from the day-to-day context of employer authority, in which they can openly discuss their workplace governance options." Barenberg is sensitive to the needs for workers to have a place to talk, and think, away from the "property and presence of management and employer-aligned consultants."8

Barenberg is fully aware that decisions about workplace governance occur in a context of asymmetric power, and his proposals deliberately tip the scales in favor of employees in order to redress that power imbalance. Workers need places to deliberate on the various governance schemes available to them away from the pressures and sentiments of management. For Barenberg, after deliberation, workers can pick a governance structure close to a "company union" if they want it that way, but they would have to actively affirm their choice in a secret ballot election.9

As part of this overall readjustment to a high-trust environment, Barenberg would require workers to actively choose among workplace governance options at designated intervals. This restores a policy used in 1933-35 when workers chose among a variety of workplace representation plans. By requiring a vote, this proposal creates an opportunity for workers to consciously reflect upon the dangers of "manipulation and paternalism (as well as the potential benefits)" inherent in such schemes.10 Second, the process of deliberating will help workers prepare themselves to monitor the good faith of both their representatives and management. A third point Barenberg makes, supported by the Survey results mentioned in the first section, is that workers in non-union workplaces who formally endorse a representational scheme will probably be more intrinsically committed to its success.

Barenberg sees his conference concept, or what he calls regional Participation Centers, as creating

as pure a setting for egalitarian, informed deliberation as is possible in a highly impure world. If we are socially committed to affording employees the free collective choice of workplace governance modes-and, in principle, we already are-then the choice is surely better made in my proposed setting than in furtive fragmented meetings or under the unilateral surveillance of a party (the employer) capable of inflicting great cost on the choosers.11 (Emphasis in original).

Another benefit from Barenberg's conference idea will be the creation of a robust "market" for unions, employees associations and other labor-oriented consultants who can be hired by the conference staff to attend conferences and help employees understand their governance options. He notes that the UAW and CWA already have sophisticated methods for determining job-design and career-development needs for various work groups and the conference scheme would encourage mobilized unions and emergent forms of employee organizations to get involved.12

Barenberg believes that the New Deal labor boards did not want to reinforce the adversarial worker-management relationships so prevalent at the time of the drafting of the Wagner Act. In his conference scheme, the staff of the Participation Center would provide a "watchdog" role currently missing in employee deliberations. It could intervene on the spot to ventilate charges of misrepresentation and the very presence of Participation Center staff would keep management from overtly intimidating their employees during any group discussion in which management participates. By returning to the pre-Taft-Hartley ban on employer discussions of major workplace governance decisions-except in the context of discussions held at Participation Centers-Barenberg hopes to soften the "inherently coercive nature of anti-union managerial and supervisory speeches in the captive-audience setting of the workplace."13

Barenberg, an expert on New Deal labor legislation, believes his proposals restore the original pragmatic vision of Robert Wagner. He concludes

Thus, the institutional, symbolic, and resource-incentive features of the new regime of labor law would cumulatively encourage the transition from low-trust, low-productivity to high-trust, high performance organizations. More important, the new legal policy would concurrently disseminate high-challenge, continuous-learning work processes and promote employee's capacities for individual self-revision, organization redesign, and collective self-governance. The law, that is, would safeguard workers against organizational forms with a high potential for structural coercion, distorted communication, and psychological manipulation, and would facilitate, although not guarantee, trust-enhancement through employees collective empowerment. The new legal regime would adapt Senator Robert Wagner's radical pragmatist vision to the economic and cultural possibilities in the crisis of bureaucratic production.14

The Dunlop Commission

After the Electromation decision President Clinton appointed The Commission for the Future of Worker-Management Relations (the Dunlop Commission). It had thirteen members. Its chair, John Dunlop, is the eminent labor-relations specialist and a former Secretary of Labor. Its Chief Counsel, Paul Weiler of Harvard Law School, has had a series of comprehensive reform proposals disseminated within the legal academic community.15 Other members included former Secretaries of Labor and Commerce, former Presidents of major labor organizations, CEO's of corporations, and labor-management relations scholars from academic institutions. Though the Commission's membership represented the "heavy weights" and well-organized portions of the workforce well, it did not have anyone voicing the concerns of large un-organized workforces such as farm workers.

On March 24, 1993, when the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce announced the formation of this Commission, they charged it with answering three questions:

1. What (if any) new methods or institutions should be
encouraged, or required, to enhance work-place productivity
through labor-management cooperation and employee
participation?

2. What (if any) changes should be made in the present
legal framework and practices of collective bargaining to
enhance cooperative behavior, improve productivity, and
reduce conflict and delay?

3. What (if anything) should be done to increase the extent
to which work-place problems are directly resolved by the
parties themselves, rather than through recourse to state
and federal courts and government regulatory bodies?16

This Commission issued a Fact Finding Report on June 2, 1994, followed by a public hearing and statement period which lasted through November 14, 1994. The Commission sought the widest possible comments on its Fact Finding Report. The overall totals are impressive: 411 witnesses at 21 public hearings, which, after transcription, ran to 4,681 pages; more than 160 statements entered into the record; and numerous other studies and presentations.17

In Sections 1 and 2 of its Final Report, the Commission discussed the demands society places on the workplace and its specific findings and recommendations for employee involvement. It notes that work is the central institution in American society ("more Americans work than vote") and we spend more time at the workplace than any other advanced country, save Japan. The workplace anchors the nation's economic performance. A skilled, hard-working workforce is our main national asset as it affects economic growth, productivity, quality, and international competitiveness.18

The Commission acknowledged the need for cooperation, and the great diversity in the seven million workplaces in the country. The use of law and regulations to bring fairness and safety into the workplace has often been resisted by management, leading to cases clogging administrative agencies and judicial courts, delays in decisions, and great distress for workers, particularly the least well paid. Many workers may know they have rights, but lack the legal, financial, and emotional resources to press for their rights in formal legal and administrative settings. Ultimately, many of their concerns could be quickly handled at the workplace level, and the Commission strongly urged that improved dispute resolution procedures be implemented in the workplace.

Dramatically, the Commission calls for a truce:

It is time to turn down the decibel count, the adversarial and hostility quotient that all to often mars discussion of worker-management relations. We must "come and reason together" to devise the best ways to assure that workers have their legislatively proscribed and socially agreed upon rights and employment norms, without burdening the economy with excessive litigation and extended administrative proceedings. We must develop institutions and practices that will allow employees and firms to cooperate at the workplace in ways that will contribute optimally to economic growth and competitive performance and to the fulfillment of social norms.

The Commission developed 10 "Goals for the 21st Century Workplace" as well as specific recommendations for distinct classes of workers such as workers in non-unionized workplaces, contingent workers, and railroad workers. It reaffirmed that workers need an independent voice for themselves, yet for companies to remain competitive they need ways of collaborating with their workers which do not break the law.

The Commission viewed its goals and recommendations as a whole cloth, and cautioned against parties picking and choosing the recommendations they like best to advocate for while ignoring the others. It worked diligently to distill its proposals to their simplest and most basic forms in order to make their discussion and adoption easier. It encouraged all parties to adopt a "mutual gains" perspective about the recommendations. Commissioner Thomas Kochan, of MIT, put it this way:

These potential mutual gains will only be achieved, however, if everyone focuses on these opportunities presented in the full report rather than on specific parts that challenge their prior positions. Some employers will not like, but need to face, the finding that labor law is not working to protect individual employee rights to join a union. Some union leaders will not like, but must face, the fact that many non-union employees want to participate in cooperative efforts with employers without the protections a union offers.19

The Commission submitted these goals for the 21st century workplace:

1. Expand coverage of employee participation and labor-management partnerships to more workers and more workplaces and to a broader array of decisions.

2. Provide workers an uncoerced opportunity to choose, or not to choose, a bargaining representative and to engage in collective bargaining.

3. Improve resolution of violations of workplace rights.

4. Decentralize and internalize responsibility for workplace regulations.

5. Improve workplace safety and health.

6. Enhance the growth of productivity in the economy as a whole.

7. Increase training and learning at the workplace and related institutions.

8. Reduce inequality by raising the earnings and benefits of workers in the lower part of the wage distribution.

9. Upgrade the economic position of contingent workers.

10. Increase dialogue and learning at the national and local levels.

The first four goals relate directly to rights and law within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act. Specific recommendations proposed that

nonunion employee participation programs should not be unlawful simply because they involve discussion of terms and conditions of work or compensation where such discussion is incidental to the broad purposes of these programs.
The recommendation clarifying Section 8(a)(2), the distinction between employee involvement programs and unions, the protections afforded workers in participation programs, and the functions of these programs compared to unions will by themselves improve the climate for these programs to proliferate.20

This idea drew a statement and pointed dissenting opinion from Commission member Douglas A. Fraser, a former president of the United Auto Workers (UAW). Fraser views Section 8(a)(2) as a bulwark against illegitimate forms of representation which deny workers a voice, and fears that any weakening of its protections may be subject to abuse. He agrees with Robert Wagner's opinion that without these protections management ends up sitting on both sides of the table. In clear language Fraser makes his point:

In no event, should employer-dominated employee representation plans be permitted merely because they are limited to dealing with specified subjects such as safety and health or training. Employer-dominated representation is undemocratic regardless of the particular subjects with which the employer-controlled representative deals.21

Thus Fraser, apparently alone among the Commission's thirteen members, recognized the vital importance "voice" played in the crafting of the Wagner Act and the need for continued vigilance in the current review of workplace policies and practices.

Congress

Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas) and Rep. Steve Gunderson (R-Wisconsin) sponsored the Teamwork For Employees and Managers Act of 1995 (TEAM Act, H.R. 743 and S. 295). They first submitted this bill in 1993, and then resubmitted it after the 1994 elections. The bill sought to amend the Wagner Act Section 8(a)(2) by inserting the following:

Provided further, That it shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under this paragraph for an employer to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any organization or entity of any kind, in which employees who participate to at least the same extent practicable as representatives of management participate, to address matters of mutual interest, including, but not limited to, issues of quality, productivity, efficiency, and safety and health, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority to be the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees or to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements with the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements between the employer and any labor organization, except that in a case in which a labor organization is the representative of such employees as provided in section 9(a), this proviso shall not apply;22

In the middle of May 1996, then Senator Robert Dole, called this legislation a "very minor piece" and a "sliver" of the total package (which linked increasing the minimum wage with ending the gas tax). He predicted President Clinton would sign the whole package with the TEAM Act included.23 Dole underestimated the red flags this legislation would raise for organized labor, which launched an all-out grassroots lobbying campaign to prevent its enactment into law.

Organized labor had a right to be concerned. This bill, as written, decreases worker's voice and increases the employers' ability to craft any arrangement it wanted and then hand-pick the employees who would be allowed to "participate to at least the same extent practicable as representatives of management." In other words, what had happened in the Electromation case would have become legal. The Republican goal of decreasing workers' voice was underscored when it blocked an amendment by Rep. James Moran (D-Virginia) which would have permitted workers themselves to chose who represented them on a workplace committee. Democrats, nevertheless, were successful in splitting the bundle Dole had tied around the minimum wage bill. This meant that the minimum wage increase, the repeal of the gas tax, and the TEAM Act would be voted on as separate bills.24

By late spring, the final version of the bill had passed both houses of Congress, but by thin margins (221-202 in the House and 53-46 in the Senate). As expected, on July 30, President Clinton vetoed the bill. He said "this legislation, rather than promoting genuine teamwork, would undermine the system of collective bargaining that has served this country so well for many decades" and "rather than encouraging true workplace cooperation, this bill would abolish protections that ensure independent and democratic representation in the workplace."25

My Turn

A regulatory agency, the courts, legal scholars, a Presidential Commission and Congress have wrestled with this issue. Most of the best ideas have been presented somewhere within these discussions. I see my task in this section as selecting the best of what has been offered, and when I can, contributing a few of my own.

The criteria for my selected recommendations include: does it acknowledge the power management has in setting the tone within the workplace; does it serve to promote independent means for workers to choose their own representatives; does it provide an independent means for quickly settling disputes; and does it protect the most vocal employees who support unions or advocate for independent worker organizations?

My Recommendations

1. Offer every worker in every workplace with more than 25 employees the opportunity to make an informed and active choice about the form of workplace governance he or she wants.

2. Should employees not choose an independent union, they still must select by secret ballot any employees who serve on joint management-worker committees with a breadth of purpose beyond an individual worker or a single team.

3. Institute independent Participation Centers where all workers can gather with representatives of the legal profession and unions to discuss workplace governance options and their likely impact on their workplaces.

4. To allow some flexibility in workplace governance, and to represent the views of workers hired after a particular governance option has been selected, write into any workplace governance agreement a specific period when it would be re-selected, changed or dropped by workers. In other words, in any particular workplace, after so many years, the selected governance option would be up for a new vote.

5. In many workplaces, management's hostility towards unions creates a climate in which employees are afraid of being fired or ruining their careers if they express their true feelings about unions or the ability of management to keep its promises. This corrupts any governance decisions made under these conditions. When a campaign has begun to select a governance option, the Participation Centers and the Board should survey employees about the atmosphere within their workplace. Any workplace showing a high degree of fear should be closely monitored, and any employee dismissals or disciplinary actions should be immediately evaluated by the nearest Participation Center as a possible violation of that worker's workplace and Constitutional rights. If a worker claims he or she was dismissed because of his or her views about workplace governance, the company should pay at least eighty percent of the worker's salary pending settlement of the claim.

6. Improve resolution of violations of Constitutional rights in the workplace. As citizens, every worker must be able to enjoy the rights of free speech and assembly within any institution (including workplaces) under the jurisdiction of the Constitution. Should an employer be found to have violated a worker's Constitutional rights, not only should the worker be restored to his or her former position and salary, with compensation for his or her emotional distress, the employer should also pay a fine to the Participation Centers. Alternative dispute resolution procedures can be discussed and voted on in every workplace along with the workers' elections for representation.

7. Now is the time for union to organize towards helping workers insist that they can exercise their Constitutional rights in the workplace. Though under 15 percent of the workforce belong to unions, our work habits and expectations are 100 percent unionized. The forty-hour workweek, paid vacations, health benefits, the five-day workweek, and safe working conditions have not showered down upon workers because of the beneficence of management-they have been wrought from management by unions, and then mimicked by managers of non-union workplaces as inoculation against their workers seeking union representation. With forty-four percent of workers willing to belong to unions if it would mean better representation for them in the workplace, unions have an opportunity. Unions should change how they recruit, and repackage the mix of "benefits" an associate member from a non-unionize worksite can expect. High among those new benefits should be legal representation and financial support if an associate member is harassed or fired for speaking out in their non-union workplace.

Conclusion

The difficulty comes down to very simple statements: unions help give workers a voice-management doesn't like for workers to have an independent collective voice. This internecine and unnecessary conflict hurts everyone. Louise Parker in an article on how nurses manage the tension between voice and exit pointed out that

It is not only individual workers who stand to suffer when workers are not given some control over decision making, but also organizations. Workers who are depressed are not likely to be productive. Moreover, organization members' dissent could lead to organizational learning and improvement. By not giving workers a voice, organizations stand to lose a potentially highly valuable source of constructive feedback.26

I join with Dunlop Commissioner Thomas Kochan in calling for a coalition for mutual gains. Such a coalition would improve the climate for worker-management relations at the national and workplace level. A climate of trust and good will would support experimentation with new approaches to workplace governance, participation, and representation.27

Trust is not something we ask for and it's delivered. Trust must be built up and is both beautiful and a necessary pre-condition for widespread social prosperity.28 But it is a social art, like a duet in dance. It may be beautiful for a time but if one partner misses a part or loses interest the piece fails to continue. It takes positive good will on the part of each dancer, and mutual support which allows the other to risk and admit vulnerability (a need for learning) without fear. As Churchill said, "Americans will do the right thing after they have tried everything else." The other ways have brought us to the current impasse; it is time to give trust a dance.

Footnotes

1 Moe, Participatory Workplace Decisionmaking p. 1173.
2 Ibid., p. 1178.
3 Ibid., p. 1180.
4 Ibid., p. 1182.
5 Ibid., p. 1183-1184.
6 Freeman, Richard, and Rogers, Joel. Final Findings. Available on the World Wide Web.
7 Barenberg, Mark. (April 1994). Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production. 94 Columbia Law Review, pp. 957-959.
8 Ibid., p. 962.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 964.
12 Ibid..
13 Ibid., p. 965.
14 Ibid., p. 983.
15 Ibid., p. 758.
16 Dunlop Commission, Available on the World Wide Web, Preface, p. 1.
17 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
18 Ibid., Section 1, p. 1.
19 Kochan, Thomas. (1995). Using the Dunlop Report to Full Advantage: A Strategy for Achieving Mutual Gains. Available 10/8/96 at: http://www.ilr.cornell.edu-/lib/bookshelf/e_archive/Dunlop/Kochan.html.
20 Dunlop Commission, Section 2, pp. 4-5.
21 Dunlop Commission, Dissenting Opinion of Douglas A. Fraser, in Section 2, p. 12.
22 Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995 (TEAM Act, H.R. 743 and S. 295), Available 10/8/96 at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query-/6?c104:./temp/~c104IGEj::.
Section 3.
23 Online NewsHour. (May 14, 1996). Power Plays. Available 10/26/96 at http://webcr01.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/may96/teamwork_congress_5-14.html.
24 News of the Day. (May 17, 1996). Issue Focus: TEAM Act Debuts in Presidential Campaign. Available 10/22/94 at http://www.legislate.com/n-/news/960517.htm.
25 Budd, J, TEAM Act Web Materials, available on the World Wide Web.
26 Parker, When to Fix It, p. 956.
27 Kochran, Section 3.
28 See Fukuyama, Francis. (1995). Trust: The Social Virtues and Creation of Prosperity. New York: The Free Press.

Bibliography

Texts

Barenberg, Mark. (May 1993). The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation. 106 Harvard Law Review, 137-1498.

Barenberg, Mark. (April 1994). Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production. 94 Columbia Law Review, 753-983.

Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations. (May 1994). Fact Finding Report. Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Labor.

Dougherty, Laurie. (1993). Jack and Me: A Review of the GE Revolution. Dollars and Sense, September/October1993:12-15.

Freeman, Richard, and Medoff, James L. (1984). What do Unions Do? New York, Basic Books.

Fukuyama, Francis. (1995). Trust: The Social Virtues and Creation of Prosperity. New York: The Free Press.

Moe, Martin T. (November 1993). Participatory Workplace Decisionmaking and the NLRA: Section 8(a)(2), Electromation, and the Specter of the Company Union. 68 New York Law Review, 1127-1186.

National Labor Relations Board. (December 1992). Electromation, Inc. and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 309 NLRB 990-1019.

National Labor Relations Board. (1993). A Guide to Basic Law and Procedures Under the National Labor Relations Act. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Nelson, Daniel. (1975). Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory System in the United States, 1880-1920. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Parker, Louise E. (1993). When to Fix it and When to Leave: Relationships Among Perceived Control, Self-Efficacy, Dissent, and Exit. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78(6):949-959.

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U.S. Department of Labor. (August, 1993). High Performance Work Practices and Firm Performance. Washington, DC: Office of the American Workplace, U. S. Department of Labor. L 1.2:P 41/993 Seattle LIB

World Wide Web

Bouyea, Bob. (1995). Three Professors are Targets of Cat Letter. Available 10/8/96 at http://www.csom.umn.edu/wwwpages/faculty/jbudd/courses-/cat_team.htm.

Budd, J. (1996). TEAM Act Web Materials for use in IR 8007 and IR 8037, (1996). Available 10/10/96 at http://www.csom.umn.edu/wwwpages-/faculty/jbudd/courses/teamact.htm.

Finamore, Carl. (1996). Labor History for Workers. Available 10/24/96 at http://www.igc.apc.org/history/carl.html.

The Commission of the Future of Worker-Management Relations (Dunlop Commission) (1995). Report and Recommendations. Available 10/8/96 at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/lib/bookshelf/e_archive/Dunlop/dunlop.contents.html.

Freeman, Richard and Rogers, Joel. (1994a). First Report of the Findings. Available on 10/17/96 at http://violet.berkeley.edu/~iir-/clre/other/rogers.html.

Freeman, Richard, and Rogers, Joel. (1994b). Worker Representation and Participation Survey-Final Findings. Available 10/17/96 at http://bovine.ssc.wisc.edu:8080/cows/wrps.html.

Grob, H. (1995). Worker Representation and Participation Survey Summary. Available 10/17/96 at http://violet.berkeley.edu/~iir/ncw/pubs-/rpts/wrps.html.

LPA. (1996). U.S. Employment Laws. Available 10/24/96 at http://www.lpa.org-/lpa/laws.html.

Labor-Management Relations. Available 10/24/96 at http://www.smeal.-psu.edu/mando/courses/blaw445/445-18.htm.

Labor Relations and Employment Law Speakers. Team Building: The Future is Now. Available 10/8/96 at http://www.mesirov.com/itlabels.htm,

Lutins, Allen. (1995). An Eclectic List of Events in the U.S. Labor History. Available 10/24/96 at http://www.nitehawk.com/alleycat/labor.html.

News of the Day. (May 17, 1996). Issue Focus: TEAM Act Debuts in Presidential Campaign. Available 10/22/94 at http://www.legislate.com/n-/news/960517.htm.

Online NewsHour. (May 14, 1996). Power Plays. Available 10/26/96 at http://webcr01.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/may96/teamwork_congress_5-14.html.

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Wimberly, Jim. (1996). What Are Employers to Do About the Legal Limitations of Employee Involvement Groups? Available on 10/8/96 at http://www.-bobbin.com/media/96april/second.htm.

Video and Film

Norma Rae. (1979). Directed by Martin Ritt. 20th Century Fox.

The Uprising of '34. (1996). Produced and directed by George Stoney, Judith Helfand and Susanne Rostock, New York: First Run-Icarus.

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